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Abstract
The Coalitional Manipulation problem has been studied extensively in the literature for many
voting rules. However, most studies have focused on the complete information setting, wherein
the manipulators know the votes of the non-manipulators. While this assumption is reason-
able for purposes of showing intractability, it is unrealistic for algorithmic considerations. In
most real-world scenarios, it is impractical to assume that the manipulators to have accurate
knowledge of all the other votes. In this work, we investigate manipulation with incomplete
information. In our framework, the manipulators know a partial order for each voter that is
consistent with the true preference of that voter. In this setting, we formulate three natural
computational notions of manipulation, namely weak, opportunistic, and strong manipulation.
We say that an extension of a partial order is viable if there exists a manipulative vote for that ex-
tension. We propose the following notions of manipulation when manipulators have incomplete
information about the votes of other voters.
1. WEAK MANIPULATION: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred
candidate win in at least one extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators.
2. OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes
their preferred candidate win in every viable extension of the partial votes of the non-
manipulators.
3. STRONG MANIPULATION: the manipulators seek to vote in a way that makes their preferred
candidate win in every extension of the partial votes of the non-manipulators.
We consider several scenarios for which the traditional manipulation problems are easy (for
instance, Borda with a single manipulator). For many of them, the corresponding manipulative
questions that we propose turn out to be computationally intractable. Our hardness results often
hold even when very little information is missing, or in other words, even when the instances are
very close to the complete information setting. Our results show that the impact of paucity of
information on the computational complexity of manipulation crucially depends on the notion
of manipulation under consideration. Our overall conclusion is that computational hardness
continues to be a valid obstruction to manipulation, in the context of a more realistic model.
Keywords: voting, manipulation, incomplete information, algorithm, computational complexity
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1 Introduction
In many real life and AI related applications, agents often need to agree upon a common decision
although they have different preferences over the available alternatives. A natural tool used in these
situations is voting. Some classic examples of the use of voting rules in the context of multiagent
systems include Clarke tax [ER91], collaborative filtering [PHG00], and similarity search [FKS03],
etc. In a typical voting scenario, we have a set of candidates and a set of voters reporting their
rankings of the candidates called their preferences or votes. A voting rule selects one candidate as
the winner once all voters provide their votes. A set of votes over a set of candidates along with
a voting rule is called an election. A central issue in voting is the possibility of manipulation. For
many voting rules, it turns out that even a single vote, if cast differently, can alter the outcome.
In particular, a voter manipulates an election if, by misrepresenting her preference, she obtains an
outcome that she prefers over the “honest” outcome. In a cornerstone impossibility result, Gibbard
and Satterthwaite [Gib73, Sat75] show that every unanimous and non-dictatorial voting rule with
three candidates or more is manipulable. We refer to [BCE+15] for an excellent introduction to
various strategic issues in computational social choice theory.
Considering that voting rules are indeed susceptible to manipulation, it is natural to seek ways
by which elections can be protected from manipulations. The works of Bartholdi et al. [BITT89,
BIO91] approach the problem from the perspective of computational intractability. They exploit
the possibility that voting rules, despite being vulnerable to manipulation in theory, may be hard to
manipulate in practice. Indeed, a manipulator is faced with the following decision problem: given
a collection of votes P and a distinguished candidate c, does there exist a vote v that, when tallied
with P, makes c win for a (fixed) voting rule r? The manipulation problem has subsequently been
generalized to the problem of COALITIONAL MANIPULATION by Conitzer et al. [CSL07], where one
or more manipulators collude together and try to make a distinguished candidate win the election.
The manipulation problem, fortunately, turns out to be NP-hard in several settings. This established
the success of the approach of demonstrating a computational barrier to manipulation.
However, despite having set out to demonstrate the hardness of manipulation, the initial results
in [BITT89] were to the contrary, indicating that many voting rules are in fact easy to manipulate.
Moreover, even with multiple manipulators involved, popular voting rules like plurality, veto, k-
approval, Bucklin, and Fallback continue to be easy to manipulate [XZP+09]. While we know that
the computational intractability may not provide a strong barrier [PR06, PR07, FKN08, XC08a,
XC08b, FHH10, Wal10, Wal11, IKM12, Dey15, DMN15b, DMN16, DMN15a, DN14, DN15] even for
rules for which the coalitional manipulation problem turns out to be NP-hard, in all other cases the
possibility of manipulation is a much more serious concern.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Formulation
In our work, we propose to extend the argument of computational intractability to address the
cases where the approach appears to fail. We note that most incarnations of the manipulation
problem studied so far are in the complete information setting, where the manipulators have com-
plete knowledge of the preferences of the truthful voters. While these assumptions are indeed the
best possible for the computationally negative results, we note that they are not reflective of typ-
ical real-world scenarios. Indeed, concerns regarding privacy of information, and in other cases,
the sheer volume of information, would be significant hurdles for manipulators to obtain complete
information. Motivated by this, we consider the manipulation problem in a natural partial infor-
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mation setting. In particular, we model the partial information of the manipulators about the votes
of the non-manipulators as partial orders over the set of candidates. A partial order over the set
of candidates will be called a partial vote. Our results show that several of the voting rules that
are easy to manipulate in the complete information setting become intractable when the manipu-
lators know only partial votes. Indeed, for many voting rules, we show that even if the ordering
of a small number of pairs of candidates is missing from the profile, manipulation becomes an in-
tractable problem. Our results therefore strengthen the view that manipulation may not be practical
if we limit the information the manipulators have at their disposal about the votes of other voters
[CWX11].
We introduce three new computational problems that, in a natural way, extend the question of
manipulation to the partial information setting. In these problems, the input is a set of partial votes
P corresponding to the votes of the non-manipulators, a non-empty set of manipulators M, and a
preferred candidate c. The task in the WEAK MANIPULATION (WM) problem is to determine if there
is a way to cast the manipulators’ votes such that c wins the election for at least one extension of
the partial votes in P. On the other hand, in the STRONG MANIPULATION (SM) problem, we would
like to know if there is a way of casting the manipulators’ votes such that c wins the election in
every extension of the partial votes in P.
We also introduce the problem of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION (OM), which is an “interme-
diate” notion of manipulation. Let us call an extension of a partial profile viable if it is possible
for the manipulators to vote in such a way that the manipulators’ desired candidate wins in that
extension. In other words, a viable extension is a YES-instance of the standard COALITIONAL MANIP-
ULATION problem. We have an opportunistic manipulation when it is possible for the manipulators
to cast a vote which makes c win the election in all viable extensions. Note that any YES-instance
of STRONG MANIPULATION is also an YES-instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION, but this may
not be true in the reverse direction. As a particularly extreme example, consider a partial profile
where there are no viable extensions: this would be a NO-instance for STRONG MANIPULATION, but
a (vacuous) YES-instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
problem allows us to explore a more relaxed notion of manipulation: one where the manipula-
tors are obliged to be successful only in extensions where it is possible to be successful. Note that
the goal with STRONG MANIPULATION is to be successful in all extensions, and therefore the only
interesting instances are the ones where all extensions are viable.
It is easy to see that YES instance of STRONG MANIPULATION is also a YES instance of OPPOR-
TUNISTIC MANIPULATION and WEAK MANIPULATION. Beyond this, we remark that all the three
problems are questions with different goals, and neither of them render the other redundant. We
refer the reader to Figure 1 for a simple example distinguishing these scenarios.
All the problems above generalize COALITIONAL MANIPULATION, and hence any computa-
tional intractability result for COALITIONAL MANIPULATION immediately yields a corresponding
intractability result for WEAK MANIPULATION, STRONG MANIPULATION, and OPPORTUNISTIC MA-
NIPULATION under the same setting. For example, it is known that the COALITIONAL MANIPULA-
TION problem is intractable for the maximin voting rule when we have at least two manipula-
tors [XZP+09]. Hence, the WEAK MANIPULATION, STRONG MANIPULATION, and OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION problems are intractable for the maximin voting rule when we have at least two
manipulators.
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Figure 1: An example of a partial profile. Consider the plurality voting rule with one manipulator.
If the favorite candidate is A, then the manipulator simply has to place A on the top of his vote
to make A win in any extension. If the favorite candidate is B, there is no vote that makes B win
in any extension. Finally, if the favorite candidate is C, then with a vote that places C on top, the
manipulator can make C win in the only viable extension (Extension 2).
1.2 Related Work
A notion of manipulation under partial information has been considered by Conitzer et
al. [CWX11]. They focus on whether or not there exists a dominating manipulation and show
that this problem is NP-hard for many common voting rules. Given some partial votes, a dom-
inating manipulation is a non-truthful vote that the manipulator can cast which makes the win-
ner at least as preferable (and sometimes more preferable) as the winner when the manipulator
votes truthfully. The dominating manipulation problem and the WEAK MANIPULATION, OPPOR-
TUNISTIC MANIPULATION, and STRONG MANIPULATION problems do not seem to have any apparent
complexity-theoretic connection. For example, the dominating manipulation problem is NP-hard
for all the common voting rules except plurality and veto, whereas, the STRONG MANIPULATION
problem is easy for most of the cases (see Table 1). However, the results in [CWX11] establish the
fact that it is indeed possible to make manipulation intractable by restricting the amount of infor-
mation the manipulators possess about the votes of the other voters. Elkind and Erde´lyi [EE12]
study manipulation under voting rule uncertainty. However, in our work, the voting rule is fixed
and known to the manipulators.
Two closely related problems that have been extensively studied in the context of incomplete
votes are POSSIBLE WINNER and NECESSARY WINNER [KL05]. In the POSSIBLE WINNER problem,
we are given a set of partial votes P and a candidate c, and the question is whether there ex-
ists an extension of P where c wins, while in the NECESSARY WINNER problem, the question
is whether c is a winner in every extension of P. Following the work in [KL05], a number
of special cases and variants of the POSSIBLE WINNER problem have been studied in the litera-
ture [CLMM10, BBF10, BRR11, BRR+12, GNNW14, XC11, DL13, NW14, BFLR12, ML15]. The
flavor of the WEAK MANIPULATION problem is clearly similar to POSSIBLE WINNER. However, we
emphasize that there are subtle distinctions between the two problems. A more elaborate compar-
ison is made in the next section.
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1.3 Our Contribution
Our primary contribution in this work is to propose and study three natural and realistic general-
izations of the computational problem of manipulation in the incomplete information setting. We
summarize the complexity results in this work in Table 1. Our results provide the following inter-
esting insights on the impact of lack of information on the computational difficulty of manipulation.
We note that the number of undetermined pairs of candidates per vote are small constants in all
our hardness results.
B We observe that the computational problem of manipulation for the plurality and veto vot-
ing rules remains polynomial time solvable even with lack of information, irrespective of the
notion of manipulation under consideration [Proposition 1, Theorem 11 and 15, and Obser-
vation 4]. We note that the plurality and veto voting rule also remain vulnerable under the
notion of dominating manipulation [CWX11].
B The impact of absence of information on the computational complexity of manipulation is
more dynamic for the k-approval, k-veto, Bucklin, Borda, and maximin voting rules. Only
the WEAK MANIPULATION and OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problems are computationally
intractable for the k-approval [Theorem 1 and 5], k-veto [Theorem 2 and 6], Bucklin [Theo-
rem 3 and 10], Borda [Observation 3 and Theorem 7], and maximin [Observation 3 and The-
orem 8] voting rules, whereas the STRONG MANIPULATION problem remains computationally
tractable [Theorem 11 to 14].
B Table 1 shows an interesting behavior of the Fallback voting rule. The Fallback voting rule is
the only voting rule among the voting rules we study here for which the WEAK MANIPULATION
problem is NP-hard [Theorem 3] but both the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION and STRONG
MANIPULATION problems are polynomial time solvable [Theorem 13 and Observation 4]. This
is because the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem can be solved for the Fallback voting
rule by simply making manipulators vote for their desired candidate.
B Our results show that absence of information makes all the three notions of manipulations
intractable for the Copelandα voting rule for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] \ {0.5} for the WEAK
MANIPULATION problem [Observation 3] and for every α ∈ [0, 1] for the OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION and STRONG MANIPULATION problems [Theorem 4 and 9].
Our results (see Table 1) show that whether lack of information makes the manipulation prob-
lems harder, crucially depends on the notion of manipulation applicable to the situation under
consideration. All the three notions of manipulations are, in our view, natural extension of manip-
ulation to the incomplete information setting and tries to capture different behaviors of manipula-
tors. For example, the WEAK MANIPULATION problem maybe applicable to an optimistic manipula-
tor whereas for an pessimistic manipulator, the STRONG MANIPULATION problem may make more
sense.
Organization of the paper: We define the problems and introduce the basic terminology in the
next section. We present our hardness results in Section 3. In Section 4, we present our polynomi-
ally solvable algorithms. Finally we conclude with future directions of research in Section 5.
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WM, ` = 1 WM OM, ` = 1 OM SM, ` = 1 SM
Plurality
Veto
P P
k-Approval
k-Veto
Bucklin
coNP-hard
Fallback
NP-complete
P
P
Borda
maximin
P
Copelandα
NP-complete coNP-hard
coNP-hard
NP-hard
Table 1: Summary of Results (` denotes the number of manipulators). The results in white follow
immediately from the literature (Observation 1 to 3). Our results for the Copelandα voting rule
hold for every rational α ∈ [0, 1]\{0.5} for the WEAK MANIPULATION problem and for every α ∈ [0, 1]
for the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION and STRONG MANIPULATION problems.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we begin by providing the technical definitions and notations that we will need in
the subsequent sections. We then formulate the problems that capture our notions of manipulation
when the votes are given as partial orders, and finally draw comparisons with related problems
that are already studied in the literature of computational social choice theory.
2.1 Notations and Definitions
Let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of all voters and C = {c1, . . . , cm} the set of all candidates. If not
specified explicitly, n and m denote the total number of voters and the total number of candidates
respectively. Each voter vi’s vote is a preference i over the candidates which is a linear order over
C. For example, for two candidates a and b, a i b means that the voter vi prefers a to b. We
denote the set of all linear orders over C by L(C). Hence, L(C)n denotes the set of all n-voters’
preference profile (1, . . . ,n). A map r : ∪n,|C|∈N+L(C)n −→ 2C \ {∅} is called a voting rule. For
some preference profile ∈ L(C)n, if r() = {w}, then we say w wins uniquely and we write
r() = w. From here on, whenever we say some candidate w wins, we mean that the candidate w
wins uniquely. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the unique winner case in this paper. All our
proofs can be easily extended in the co-winner case.
A more general setting is an election where the votes are only partial orders over candidates.
A partial order is a relation that is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. A partial vote can be
extended to possibly more than one linear vote depending on how we fix the order of the unspeci-
fied pairs of candidates. For example, in an election with the set of candidates C = {a,b, c}, a valid
partial vote can be a  b. This partial vote can be extended to three linear votes namely, a  b  c,
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a  c  b, c  a  b. In this paper, we often define a partial vote like  \A, where ∈ L(C)
and A ⊂ C× C, by which we mean the partial vote obtained by removing the order among the pair
of candidates in A from . Also, whenever we do not specify the order among a set of candidates
while describing a complete vote, the statement/proof is correct in whichever way we fix the order
among them. We now give examples of some common voting rules.
B Positional scoring rules: An m-dimensional vector ~α = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ Rm with α1 >
α2 > . . . > αm and α1 > αm naturally defines a voting rule – a candidate gets score αi
from a vote if it is placed at the ith position, and the score of a candidate is the sum of the
scores it receives from all the votes. The winners are the candidates with maximum score.
Scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by any constant λ > 0 and/or add
any constant µ. Hence, we assume without loss of generality that for any score vector ~α, there
exists a j such that αj−αj+1 = 1 and αk = 0 for all k > j. We call such a ~α a normalized score
vector. For ~α = (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 1, 0), we get the Borda voting rule. With αi = 1 ∀i 6 k
and 0 else, the voting rule we get is known as k-approval. For the k-veto voting rule, we have
αi = 0 ∀i 6 m− k and −1 else. Plurality is 1-approval and veto is 1-veto.
B Bucklin and simplified Bucklin: Let ` be the minimum integer such that at least one can-
didate gets majority within top ` positions of the votes. The winners under the simplified
Bucklin voting rule are the candidates having more than n/2 votes within top ` positions. The
winners under the Bucklin voting rule are the candidates appearing within top ` positions of
the votes highest number of times.
B Fallback and simplified Fallback: For these voting rules, each voter v ranks a subset Xv ⊂ C
of candidates and disapproves the rest of the candidates [BS09]. Now for the Fallback and
simplified Fallback voting rules, we apply the Bucklin and simplified Bucklin voting rules re-
spectively to define winners. If there is no integer ` for which at least one candidate gets more
than n/2 votes, both the Fallback and simplified Fallback voting rules output the candidates
with most approvals as winners. We assume, for simplicity, that the number of candidates
each partial vote approves is known.
B Maximin: For any two candidates x and y, let D(x,y) be N(x,y) − N(y, x), where N(x,y)
(respectively N(y, x)) is the number of voters who prefer x to y (respectively y to x). The
election we get by restricting all the votes to x and y only is called the pairwise election
between x and y. The maximin score of a candidate x is miny6=xD(x,y). The winners are the
candidates with maximum maximin score.
B Copelandα. The Copelandα score of a candidate x is |{y 6= x : DE(x,y) > 0}| + α|{y 6= x :
DE(x,y) = 0}|, where α ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the Copelandα of a candidate x is the number of
other candidates it defeats in pairwise election plus α times the number of other candidates it
ties with in pairwise elections. The winners are the candidates with the maximum Copelandα
score.
2.2 Problem Definitions
We now formally define the three problems that we consider in this work, namely WEAK MANIPU-
LATION, OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION, and STRONG MANIPULATION. Let r be a fixed voting rule.
We first introduce the WEAK MANIPULATION problem.
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Definition 1. r-WEAK MANIPULATION
Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C, a positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number
of manipulators, and a candidate c, do there exist votes 1, . . . ,` ∈ L(C) such that there exists an
extension ∈ L(C)|P| of P with r(,1, . . . ,`) = c?
To define the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem, we first introduce the notion of an (r, c)-
opportunistic voting profile, where r is a voting rule and c is any particular candidate.
Definition 2. (r, c)-Opportunistic Voting Profile
Let ` be the number of manipulators and P a set of partial votes. An `-voter profile (i)i∈[`] ∈ L(C)` is
called an (r, c)-opportunistic voting profile if for each extension P of P for which there exists an `-vote
profile (′i)i∈[`] ∈ L(C)` with r
(
P ∪ (′i)i∈[`]) = c, we have r(P ∪ (i)i∈[`]) = c.
In other words, an `-vote profile is (r, c)-opportunistic with respect to a partial profile if, when
put together with the truthful votes of any extension, c wins if the extension is viable to begin with.
We are now ready to define the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem.
Definition 3. r-OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C, a positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number
of manipulators, and a candidate c, does there exist an (r, c)-opportunistic `-vote profile?
We finally define the STRONG MANIPULATION problem.
Definition 4. r-STRONG MANIPULATION
Given a set of partial votes P over a set of candidates C, a positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number
of manipulators, and a candidate c, do there exist votes (i)i∈` ∈ L(C)` such that for every extension
∈ L(C)|P| of P, we have r(, (i)i∈[`]) = c?
We use (P, `, c) to denote instances of WEAK MANIPULATION, OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION,
and STRONG MANIPULATION, where P denotes a profile of partial votes, ` denotes the number of
manipulators, and c denotes the desired winner.
For the sake of completeness, we provide the definitions of the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
and POSSIBLE WINNER problems below.
Definition 5. r-COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
Given a set of complete votes over a set of candidates C, a positive integer ` (> 0) denoting the number
of manipulators, and a candidate c, do there exist votes (i)i∈` ∈ L(C)` such that r
(
, (i)i∈[`]
)
=
c?
Definition 6. r-POSSIBLE WINNER
Given a set of partial votes P and a candidate c, does there exist an extension  of the partial votes in
P to linear votes such that r() = c?
2.3 Comparison with Possible Winner and Coalitional Manipulation
For any fixed voting rule, the WEAK MANIPULATION problem with ` manipulators reduces to the
POSSIBLE WINNER problem. This is achieved by simply using the same set as truthful votes and
introducing ` empty votes. We summarize this in the observation below.
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Observation 1. The WEAK MANIPULATION problem many-to-one reduces to the POSSIBLE WINNER
problem for every voting rule.
Proof. Let (P, `, c) be an instance of WEAK MANIPULATION. Let Q be the set consisting of ` many
copies of partial votes {∅}. Clearly the WEAK MANIPULATION instance (P, `, c) is equivalent to the
POSSIBLE WINNER instance (P ∪ Q, c).
However, whether the POSSIBLE WINNER problem reduces to the WEAK MANIPULATION problem
or not is not clear since in any WEAK MANIPULATION problem instance, there must exist at least
one manipulator and a POSSIBLE WINNER instance may have no empty vote. From a technical
point of view, the difference between the WEAK MANIPULATION and POSSIBLE WINNER problems
may look marginal; however we believe that the WEAK MANIPULATION problem is a very natural
generalization of the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem in the partial information setting and
thus worth studying. Similarly, it is easy to show, that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem
with `manipulators reduces to WEAK MANIPULATION, OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION, and STRONG
MANIPULATION problems with ` manipulators, since the former is a special case of the latter ones.
Observation 2. The COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem with ` manipulators many-to-one reduces
to WEAK MANIPULATION, OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION, and STRONG MANIPULATION problems
with ` manipulators for all voting rules and for all positive integers `.
Proof. Follows from the fact that every instance of the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem is also
an equivalent instance of the WEAK MANIPULATION, OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION, and STRONG
MANIPULATION problems.
Finally, we note that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem with ` manipulators can be
reduced to the WEAK MANIPULATION problem with just one manipulator, by introducing `−1 empty
votes. These votes can be used to witness a good extension in the forward direction. In the reverse
direction, given an extension where the manipulator is successful, the extension can be used as the
manipulator’s votes. This argument leads to the following observation.
Observation 3. The COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem with ` manipulators many-to-one reduces
to the WEAK MANIPULATION problem with one manipulator for every voting rule and for every positive
integer `.
Proof. Let (P, `, c) be an instance of COALITIONAL MANIPULATION. Let Q be the set of consisting of
`−1 many copies of partial vote {c  others}. Clearly the WEAK MANIPULATION instance (P∪Q, 1, c)
is equivalent to the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION instance (P, `, 1).
This observation can be used to derive the hardness of WEAK MANIPULATION even for one ma-
nipulator whenever the hardness for COALITIONAL MANIPULATION is known for any fixed number
of manipulators (for instance, this is the case for the voting rules such as Borda, maximin and
Copeland). However, determining the complexity of WEAK MANIPULATION with one manipulator
requires further work for voting rules where COALITIONAL MANIPULATION is polynomially solvable
for any number of manipulators (such as k-approval, Plurality, Bucklin, and so on).
9
3 Hardness Results
In this section, we present our hardness results. While some of our reductions are from the POS-
SIBLE WINNER problem, the other reductions in this section are from the EXACT COVER BY 3-SETS
problem, also referred to as X3C. This is a well-known NP-complete [GJ79] problem, and is defined
as follows.
Definition 7 (Exact Cover by 3-Sets (X3C)). Given a set U and a collection S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St} of t
subsets of U with |Si| = 3 ∀i = 1, . . . , t, does there exist a T ⊂ S with |T| = |U|3 such that ∪X∈TX = U?
We use X3C to refer to the complement of X3C, which is to say that an instance of X3C is a YES
instance if and only if it is a NO instance of X3C. The rest of this section is organized according to
the problems being addressed.
3.1 Weak Manipulation
To begin with, recall that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the
Borda [DKNW11, BNW11], maximin [XZP+09], and Copelandα [FHS08, FHHR09, FHS10] vot-
ing rules for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] \ {0.5}, when we have two manipulators. Therefore, it follows
from Observation 3 that the WEAK MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the Borda, maximin,
and Copelandα voting rules for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] \ {0.5}, even with one manipulator.
For the k-approval and k-veto voting rules, we reduce from the corresponding POSSIBLE WIN-
NER problems. While it is natural to start from the same voting profile, the main challenge is in
undoing the advantage that the favorite candidate receives from the manipulator’s vote, in the
reverse direction.
We begin with proving that the WEAK MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the k-approval
voting rule even with one manipulator and at most 4 undetermined pairs per vote.
Theorem 1. The WEAK MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the k-approval voting rule even
with one manipulator for any constant k > 1, even when the number of undetermined pairs in each
vote is no more than 4.
Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we prove the theorem for 2-approval. We reduce from the
POSSIBLE WINNER problem for 2-approval which is NP-complete [XC11], even when the number of
undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than 4. Let P be the set of partial votes in a POSSIBLE
WINNER instance, and let C = {c1, . . . , cm, c} be the set of candidates, where the goal is to check if
there is an extension of P that makes c win. For developing the instance of WEAK MANIPULATION,
we need to “reverse” any advantage that the candidate c obtains from the vote of the manipulator.
Notice that the most that the manipulator can do is to increase the score of c by one. Therefore,
in our construction, we “artificially” increase the score of all the other candidates by one, so that
despite of the manipulator’s vote, c will win the new election if and only if it was a possible winner
in the POSSIBLE WINNER instance. To this end, we introduce (m + 1) many dummy candidates
d1, . . . ,dm+1 and the complete votes:
wi = ci  di  others, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
Further, we extend the given partial votes of the POSSIBLE WINNER instance to force the dummy
candidates to be preferred least over the rest - by defining, for every vi ∈ P, the corresponding
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partial vote v′i as follows.
v′i = vi ∪ {C  {d1, . . . ,dm+1}}.
This ensures that all the dummy candidates do not receive any score from the modified partial votes
corresponding to the partial votes of the POSSIBLE WINNER instance. Notice that since the number
of undetermined pairs in vi is no more than 4, the number of undetermined pairs in v′i is also no
more than 4. Let (C′,Q, c) denote this constructed WEAK MANIPULATION instance. We claim that
the two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, suppose c is a possible winner with respect to P, and let P be an
extension where c wins. Then it is easy to see that the manipulator can make c win in some
extension by placing c and dm+1 in the first two positions of her vote (note that the partial score
of dm+1 is zero in Q). Indeed, consider the extension of Q obtained by mimicking the extension P
on the “common” partial votes, {v′i | vi ∈ P}. Notice that this is well-defined since vi and v′i have
exactly the same set of incomparable pairs. In this extension, the score of c is strictly greater than
the scores of all the other candidates, since the scores of all candidates in C is exactly one more
than their scores in P, and all the dummy candidates have a score of at most one.
In the reverse direction, notice that the manipulator puts the candidates c and dm+1 in the top
two positions without loss of generality. Now suppose the manipulator’s vote c  dm+1  others
makes c win the election for an extension Q of Q. Then consider the extension P obtained by
restricting Q to C. Notice that the score of each candidate in C in this extension is one less than
their scores in Q. Therefore, the candidate c wins this election as well, concluding the proof.
The above proof can be imitated for any other constant values of k by reducing it from the
POSSIBLE WINNER problem for k-approval and introducing (m+ 1)(k− 1) dummy candidates.
We will use Lemma 1 in subsequent proofs which has been used before [BRR11, DMN15b,
DMN16].
Lemma 1. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm}unionmultiD, (|D| > 0) be a set of candidates, and ~α a normalized score vector
of length |C|. Then, for any given X = (X1, . . . ,Xm) ∈ Zm, there exists λ ∈ R and a voting profile such
that the ~α-score of ci is λ + Xi for all 1 6 i 6 m, and the score of candidates d ∈ D is less than λ.
Moreover, the number of votes is O(poly(|C| ·∑mi=1 |Xi|, λ)).
Note that the number of votes used in Lemma 1 is polynomial in m if λ and |Xi| is polynomial
in m for every i ∈ [m], which indeed is the case in all the proofs that use Lemma 1. We next show
that the WM problem is NP-complete for the k-veto voting rule.
Theorem 2. The WEAK MANIPULATION problem for the k-veto voting rule is NP-complete even with
one manipulator for any constant k > 1.
Proof. We reduce from the POSSIBLE WINNER problem for the k-veto voting rule which is known to
be NP-complete [BD09]. Let P be the set of partial votes in a POSSIBLE WINNER problem instance,
and let C = {c1, . . . , cm, c} be the set of candidates, where the goal is to check if there is an extension
that makes c win with respect to k-veto. We assume without loss of generality that c’s position is
fixed in all the partial votes (if not, then we fix the position of c as high as possible in every vote).
We introduce k + 1 many dummy candidates d1, . . . ,dk,d. The role of the first k dummy can-
didates is to ensure that the manipulator is forced to place them at the “bottom k” positions of her
vote, so that all the original candidates get the same score from the additional vote of the manip-
ulator. The most natural way of achieving this is to ensure that the dummy candidates have the
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same score as c in any extension (note that we know the score of c since c’s position is fixed in
all the partial votes). This would force the manipulator to place these k candidates in the last k
positions. Indeed, doing anything else will cause these candidates to tie with c, even when there is
an extension of P that makes c win.
To this end, we begin by placing the dummy candidates in the top k positions in all the partial
votes. Formally, we modify every partial vote as follows:
w = di  others, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}
At this point, we know the scores of c and di, for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}. Using Lemma 1, we add
complete votes such that the final score of c is the same with the score of every di and the score of
c is strictly more than the score of d. The relative score of every other candidate remains the same.
This completes the description of the construction. We denote the augmented set of partial votes
by P.
We now argue the correctness. In the forward direction, if there is an extension of the votes that
makes c win, then we repeat this extension, and the vote of the manipulator puts the candidate di
at the position m + i + 2; and all the other candidates in an arbitrary fashion. Formally, we let the
manipulator’s vote be:
v = c  c1  · · ·  cm  d  d1  · · ·  dk.
By construction c wins the election in this particular setup. In the reverse direction, consider a
vote of the manipulator and an extension Q of P in which c wins. Note that the manipulator’s vote
necessarily places the candidates di in the bottom k positions — indeed, if not, then c cannot win
the election by construction. We extend a partial vote w ∈ P by mimicking the extension of the
corresponding partial vote w′ ∈ P, that is, we simply project the extension of w′ on the original
set of candidates C. Let Q denote this proposed extension of P. We claim that c wins the election
given by Q. Indeed, suppose not. Let ci be a candidate whose score is at least the score of c in the
extension Q. Note that the scores of ci and c in the extension Q are exactly the same as their scores
in Q, except for a constant offset — importantly, their scores are offset by the same amount. This
implies that the score of ci is at least the score of c in Q as well, which is a contradiction. Hence,
the two instances are equivalent.
We next prove, by a reduction from X3C, that the WEAK MANIPULATION problem for the Bucklin
and simplified Bucklin voting rules is NP-complete even with one manipulator and at most 16
undetermined pairs per vote.
Theorem 3. The WEAK MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for Bucklin, simplified Bucklin, Fall-
back, and simplified Fallback voting rules, even when we have only one manipulator and the number
of undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than 16.
Proof. We reduce the X3C problem to WEAK MANIPULATION for simplified Bucklin. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,um}, S := {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) be an instance of X3C, where each Si is a subset of U of size
three. We construct a WEAK MANIPULATION instance based on (U, S) as follows.
Candidate set: C =W ∪ X ∪D ∪ U ∪ {c,w,a,b}, where |W| = m− 3, |X| = 4, |D| = m+ 1
We first introduce the following partial votes P in correspondence with the sets in the family as
follows.
W  X  Si  c  (U \ Si)  D \ ({X× ({c} ∪ Si)}) ,∀i 6 t
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Notice that the number of undetermined pairs in every vote in P is 16. We introduce the following
additional complete votes Q:
B t copies of U  c  others
B m/3− 1 copies of U  a  c  others
B m/3+ 1 copies of D  b  others
The total number of voters, including the manipulator, is 2t+ 2m/3+ 1. Now we show equivalence
of the two instances.
In the forward direction, suppose we have an exact set cover T ⊂ S. Let the vote of the
manipulator v be c  D  others. We consider the following extension P of P.
W  Si  c  X  (U \ Si)  D
On the other hand, if Si ∈ S \ T, then we have:
W  X  Si  c  (U \ Si)  D
We claim that c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner in the profile (P,W, v). Notice that the
simplified Bucklin score of c is m + 1 in this extension, since it appears in the top m + 1 positions
in the m/3 votes corresponding to the set cover, t votes from the complete profile Q and one vote
v of the manipulator. For any other candidate ui ∈ U, ui appears in the top m + 1 positions once
in P and t + m3 − 1 times in Q. Thus, ui does not get majority in top m + 1 positions making its
simplified Bucklin score at least m + 2. Hence, c is the unique simplified Bucklin winner in the
profile (P,W, v). Similarly, the candidate w1 appears only t times in the top m + 1 positions. The
same can be argued for the remaining candidates in D,W, and w.
In the reverse direction, suppose the WEAK MANIPULATION is a YES instance. We may assume
without loss of generality that the manipulator’s vote v is c  D  others, since the simplified
Bucklin score of the candidates in D is at least 2m. Let P be the extension of P such that c is the
unique winner in the profile (P,Q, v). As every candidate in W is ranked within topm+ 2 positions
in t+ m3 +1 votes in Q, for c to win, c  X must hold in at least m3 votes in P. In those votes, all the
candidates in Si are also within top m+ 2 positions. Now if any candidate in U is within top m+ 1
positions in P more than once, then c will not be the unique winner. Hence, the Si’s corresponding
to the votes where c  X in P form an exact set cover.
The reduction above also works for the Bucklin voting rule. Specifically, the argument for the
forward direction is exactly the same as the simplified Bucklin above and the argument for the
reverse direction is as follows. Every candidate in W is ranked within top m + 2 positions in
t + m3 + 1 votes in Q and c is never placed within top m + 2 positions in any vote in Q. Hence, for
c to win, c  X must hold in at least m3 votes in P. In those votes, all the candidates in Si are also
within topm positions. Notice that c never gets placed within topm positions in any vote in (P,Q).
Now if any candidate x ∈ U is within top m positions in P more than once, then x gets majority
within top m positions and thus c cannot win.
The result for the Fallback and simplified Fallback voting rules follow from the corresponding
results for the Bucklin and simplified Bucklin voting rules respectively since every Bucklin and
simplified Bucklin election is also a Fallback and simplified Fallback election respectively.
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3.2 Strong Manipulation
We know that the COALITIONAL MANIPULATION problem is NP-complete for the Borda, maximin,
and Copelandα voting rules for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] \ {0.5}, when we have two manipulators.
Thus, it follows from Observation 2 that STRONG MANIPULATION is NP-hard for Borda, maximin,
and Copelandα voting rules for every rational α ∈ [0, 1] \ {0.5} for at least two manipulators.
For the case of one manipulator, STRONG MANIPULATION turns out to be polynomial-time solv-
able for most other voting rules. For Copelandα, however, we show that the problem is co-NP-hard
for every α ∈ [0, 1] for a single manipulator, even when the number of undetermined pairs in each
vote is bounded by a constant. This is achieved by a careful reduction from X3C. The following
lemma has been used before [McG53].
Lemma 2. For any function f : C× C −→ Z, such that
1. ∀a,b ∈ C, f(a,b) = −f(b,a).
2. ∀a,b, c,d ∈ C, f(a,b) + f(c,d) is even,
there exists a n-voters’ profile such that for all a,b ∈ C, a defeats b with a margin of f(a,b). Moreover,
n is even and n = O
 ∑
{a,b}∈C×C
|f(a,b)|

We have following intractability result for the STRONG MANIPULATION problem for the
Copelandα rule with one manipulator and at most 10 undetermined pairs per vote.
Theorem 4. STRONG MANIPULATION is co-NP-hard for Copelandα voting rule for every α ∈ [0, 1]
even when we have only one manipulator and the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is no
more than 10.
Proof. We reduce X3C to STRONG MANIPULATION for Copelandα rule. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,um}, S =
{S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We assume, without loss of generality, t to be an even integer
(if not, replicate any set from S). We construct a corresponding WEAK MANIPULATION instance for
Copelandα as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c,w, z,d}
Partial votes P:
∀i 6 t, (U \ Si)  c  z  d  Si  w \ {{z, c}× (Si ∪ {d,w})}
Notice that the number of undetermined pairs in every vote in P is 10. Now we add a set Q of
complete votes with |Q| even and |Q| = poly(m, t) using Lemma 2 to achieve the following margin
of victories in pairwise elections. Figure 2 shows the weighted majority graph of the resulting
election.
B DQ(d, z) = DQ(z, c) = DQ(c,d) = DQ(w, z) = 4t
B DQ(ui,d) = DQ(c,ui) = 4t ∀ui ∈ U
B DQ(z,ui) = t ∀ui ∈ U
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B DQ(c,w) = t− 2m3 − 2
B DQ(ui,ui+1 (mod ∗)m) = 4t ∀ui ∈ U
B DQ(a,b) = 0 for every a,b ∈ C,a 6= b, not mentioned above
w
zc
d uj uj+1
4t
4t
4t 4t
4t
4t
t
t− 2m3 − 2
4t
Figure 2: Weighted majority graph of the reduced instance in Theorem 4. The weight of all the
edges not shown in the figure are 0. For simplicity, we do not show edges among {u1, . . . ,um}.
We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Notice that the number of votes in
the STRONG MANIPULATION instance (P ∪ Q, 1, c) including the manipulator’s vote is odd (since |P|
and |Q| are even integers). Therefore, DP∗∪Q∪{v∗}(a,b) is never zero for every a,b ∈ C,a 6= b in
every extension P∗ of P and manipulators vote v∗ and consequently the particular value of α does
not play any role in this reduction. Hence, we assume, without loss of generality, α to be zero from
here on and simply use the term Copeland instead of Copelandα.
Now we show that the X3C instance (U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the STRONG MANIPU-
LATION instance (P∪Q, 1, c) is a NO instance (a STRONG MANIPULATION instance is a NO instance if
there does not exist a vote of the manipulator which makes c the unique winner in every extension
of the partial votes). We can assume without loss of generality that manipulator puts c at first
position and z at last position in her vote v.
Assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose (by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm
3
forms
an exact set cover. We claim that the following extension P of P makes both z and c Copeland
co-winners.
Extension P of P:
i 6 m
3
, (U \ Si)  c  z  d  Si  w
i > m
3
+ 1, (U \ Si)  d  Si  w  c  z
We have summarize the pairwise margins between z and c and the rest of the candidates from
the profile (P ∪ Q ∪ v) in Table 2. The candidates z and c are the co-winners with Copeland score
(m+ 1).
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C \ {z} DP∪Q∪v(z, ·) C \ {c} DP∪Q∪v(c, ·)
c > 3t z,ui ∈ U > 3t
w,d 6 −3t w −1
ui ∈ U 1 d 6 −3t
Table 2: DP∪Q∪v(z, ·) and DP∪Q∪v(c, ·)
For the other direction, notice that Copeland score of c is at least m + 1 since c defeats d and
every candidate in U in every extension of P. Also notice that the Copeland score of z can be at
most m + 1 since z loses to w and d in every extension of P. Hence the only way c cannot be the
unique winner is that z defeats all candidates in U and w defeats c.
This requiresw  c in at least t−m3 extensions of P. We claim that the sets Si in the remaining of
the extensions where c  w forms an exact set cover for (U, S). Indeed, otherwise some candidate
ui ∈ U is not covered. Then, notice that ui  z in all t votes, making D(z,ui) = −1.
3.3 Opportunistic Manipulation
All our reductions for the co-NP-hardness for OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION start from X3C. We
note that all our hardness results hold even when there is only one manipulator. Our overall
approach is the following. We engineer a set of partial votes in such a way that the manipulator is
forced to vote in a limited number of ways to have any hope of making her favorite candidate win.
For each such vote, we demonstrate a viable extension where the vote fails to make the candidate
a winner, leading to a NO instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION. These extensions rely on
the existence of an exact cover. On the other hand, we show that if there is no exact set cover,
then there is no viable extension, thereby leading to an instance that is vacuously a YES instance of
OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION. Our first result on OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION shows that the
OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the k-approval voting rule for constant
k > 3 even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined pairs in each
vote is no more than 15.
Theorem 5. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the k-approval voting
rule for constant k > 3 even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined
pairs in each vote is no more than 15.
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for k-approval rule. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,um}, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We construct a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION instance for k-approval voting rule as follows. We begin by introducing a candidate
for every element of the universe, along with k− 3 dummy candidates (denoted by W), and special
candidates {c, z1, z2,d, x,y}. Formally, we have:
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2,d, x,y} ∪W.
Now, for every set Si in the universe, we define the following total order on the candidate set,
which we denote by P′i:
W  Si  y  z1  z2  x  (U \ Si)  c  d
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Using P′i, we define the partial vote Pi as follows:
Pi = P
′
i \ ({{y, x, z1, z2}× Si} ∪ {(z1, z2), (x, z1), (x, z2)}).
We denote the set of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We remark that the
number of undetermined pairs in each partial vote Pi is 15.
We now invoke Lemma 1 from [DMN16], which allows to achieve any pre-defined scores on the
candidates using only polynomially many additional votes. Using this, we add a set Q of complete
votes with |Q| = poly(m, t) to ensure the following scores, where we denote the k-approval score of
a candidate from a set of votes V by sV(·): sQ(z1) = sQ(z2) = sQ(y) = sQ(c) −m/3; sQ(d), sQ(w) 6
sQ(c) − 2t ∀w ∈W; sQ(x) = sQ(c) − 1; sP′∪Q(uj) = sQ(c) + 1 ∀j ∈ [m].
Our reduced instance is (P∪Q, 1, c). The reasoning for this score configuration will be apparent
as we argue the equivalence. We first argue that if we had a YES instance of X3C (in other words,
there is no exact cover), then we have a YES instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION. It turns
out that this will follow from the fact that there are no viable extensions, because, as we will show
next, a viable extension implies the existence of an exact set cover.
To this end, first observe that the partial votes are constructed in such a way that c gets no
additional score from any extension. Assuming that the manipulator approves c (without loss of
generality), the final score of c in any extension is going to be sQ(c) + 1. Now, in any viable
extension, every candidate uj has to be “pushed out” of the top k positions at least once. Observe
that whenever this happens, y is forced into the top k positions. Since y is behind the score of c by
only m/3 votes, Si’s can be pushed out of place in only m/3 votes. For every uj to lose one point,
these votes must correspond to an exact cover. Therefore, if there is no exact cover, then there is
no viable extension, showing one direction of the reduction.
On the other hand, suppose we have a NO instance of X3C – that is, there is an exact cover. Let
{Si : i ∈ [m/3]} forms an exact cover of U. We will now use the exact cover to come up with two
viable extensions, both of which require the manipulator to vote in different ways to make c win.
Therefore, there is no single manipulative vote that accounts for both extensions, leading us to a
NO instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION.
First, consider this completion of the partial votes:
i = 1,W  y  x  z1  z2  Si  (U \ Si)  c  d
2 6 i 6 m/3,W  y  z1  z2  x  Si  (U \ Si)  c  d
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t,W  Si  y  z1  z2  x  (U \ Si)  c  d
Notice that in this completion, once accounted for along with the votes in Q, the score of c is tied
with the scores of all uj’s, z1, x and y, while the score of z2 is one less than the score of c. Therefore,
the only k candidates that the manipulator can afford to approve are W, the candidates c,d and z2.
However, consider the extension that is identical to the above except with the first vote changed to:
W  y  x  z2  z1  Si  (U \ Si)  c  d
Here, on the other hand, the only way for c to be an unique winner is if the manipulator ap-
proves W, c,d and z1. Therefore, it is clear that there is no way for the manipulator to provide
a consolidated vote for both these profiles. Therefore, we have a NO instance of OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION.
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We next move on to the k-veto voting rule and show that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
problem for the k-veto is co-NP-hard for every constant k > 4 even when the number of manipula-
tors is one and the number of undetermined pairs in each vote is no more than 15.
Theorem 6. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the k-veto voting rule for
every constant k > 4 even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined
pairs in each vote is no more than 15.
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for k-veto rule. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,um}, S =
{S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We construct a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
instance for k-veto voting rule as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2,d, x,y} ∪A ∪W, where A = {a1,a2,a3}, |W| = k− 4
For every i ∈ [t], we define P′i as follows:
∀i 6 t, c  A  (U \ Si)  d  Si  y  x  z1  z2 W
Using P′i, we define partial vote Pi = P
′
i \ ({{y, x, z1, z2} × Si} ∪ {(z1, z2), (x, z1), (x, z2)}) for every
i ∈ [t]. We denote the set of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We note that
the number of undetermined pairs in each partial vote Pi is 15. Using Lemma 1, we add a set Q
of complete votes with |Q| = poly(m, t) to ensure the following. We denote the k-veto score of a
candidate from a set of votes W by sW(·).
B sP′∪Q(z1) = sP′∪Q(z2) = sP′∪Q(c) −m/3
B sP′∪Q(ai) = sP′∪Q(uj) = sP′∪Q(w) = sP′∪Q(c) ∀ai ∈ A,uj ∈ U,w ∈W
B sP′∪Q(y) = sP′∪Q(c) −m/3− 1
B sP′∪Q(x) = sP′∪Q(c) − 2
We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Now we show that the X3C instance
(U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance (P ∪ Q, 1, c) is a
NO instance.
In the forward direction, let us now assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose
(by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm/3 forms an exact set cover. Let us assume that the manipulator’s vote
v disapproves every candidate in W ∪ A since otherwise c can never win uniquely. We now show
that if v does not disapprove z1 then, v is not a c-optimal vote. Suppose v does not disapprove z1.
Then we consider the following extension P of P.
i = 1, c  A  (U \ Si)  d  y  z1  x  z2  Si W
2 6 i 6 m/3, c  A  (U \ Si)  d  y  z1  z2  x  Si W
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t, c  A  (U \ Si)  d  Si  y  x  z1  z2 W
We have the following scores sP∪Q(c) = sP∪Q(z1) = sP∪Q(z2) + 1 = sP∪Q(x) + 1 = sP∪Q(uj) +
1 ∀uj ∈ U. Hence, both c and z1 win for the votes P∪Q∪{v}. However, the vote v′ which disapproves
a1,a2,a3, z1 makes c a unique winner for the votes P ∪ Q ∪ {v′}. Hence, v is not a c-optimal vote.
Similarly, we can show that if the manipulator’s vote does not disapprove z2 then, the vote is not
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c-optimal. Hence, there does not exist any c-optimal vote and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
instance is a NO instance.
In the reverse direction, we show that if the X3C instance is a NO instance, then there does not
exist a vote v of the manipulator and an extension P of P such that c is the unique winner for the
votes P∪Q∪ {v′} thereby proving that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is vacuously YES
(and thus every vote is c-optimal). Notice that, there must be at least m/3 votes P1 in P where the
corresponding Si gets pushed in bottom k positions since sP′∪Q(uj) = sP′∪Q(c) ∀ai ∈ A,uj ∈ U.
However, in each vote in P1, y is placed within top m − k many position and thus we have |P1|
is exactly m/3 since sP′∪Q(y) = sP′∪Q(c) − m/3 − 1. Now notice that there must be at least one
candidate u ∈ U which is not covered by the sets Sis corresponding to the votes P1 because
the X3C instance is a NO instance. Hence, c cannot win the election uniquely irrespective of the
manipulator’s vote. Thus every vote is c-optimal and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance
is a YES instance.
We show next similar intractability result for the Borda voting rule too with only at most 7
undetermined pairs per vote.
Theorem 7. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the Borda voting rule
even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is
no more than 7.
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for the Borda rule. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,um}, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. Without loss of generality we assume that
m is not divisible by 6 (if not, then we add three new elements b1,b2,b3 to U and a set {b1,b2,b3}
to S). We construct a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance for the Borda voting
rule as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2,d,y}
For every i ∈ [t], we define P′i as follows:
∀i 6 t,y  Si  z1  z2  (U \ Si)  d  c
Using P′i, we define partial vote Pi = P
′
i \ ({({y}∪ Si)× {z1, z2}}∪ {(z1, z2)}) for every i ∈ [t]. We
denote the set of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We note that the number of
undetermined pairs in each partial vote Pi is 7. Using Lemma 1, we add a set Q of complete votes
with |Q| = poly(m, t) to ensure the following. We denote the Borda score of a candidate from a set
of votes W by sW(·).
B sP′∪Q(y) = sP′∪Q(c) +m+m/3+ 3
B sP′∪Q(z1) = sP′∪Q(c) − 3bm/6c− 2
B sP′∪Q(z2) = sP′∪Q(c) − 5bm/6c− 3
B sP′∪Q(ui) = sP′∪Q(c) +m+ 5− i ∀i ∈ [m]
B sP′∪Q(d) 6 sP′∪Q(c) − 5m
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We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Now we show that the X3C instance
(U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance (P∪Q, 1, c) is a NO
instance. Notice that we can assume without loss of generality that the manipulator places c at the
first position, d at the second position, the candidate ui at (m+ 5− i)th position for every i ∈ [m],
and y at the last position, since otherwise c can never win uniquely irrespective of the extension of
P (that it, the manipulator’s vote looks like c  d  {z1, z2}  um  um−1  · · ·  u1  y).
In the forward direction, let us now assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose
(by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm/3 forms an exact set cover. Let the manipulator’s vote v be c  d 
z1  z2  um  · · ·  u1  y. We now argue that v is not a c-optimal vote. The other case where
the manipulator’s vote v′ be c  d  z2  z1  um  · · ·  u1  y can be argued similarly. We
consider the following extension P of P.
1 6 i 6 bm/6c, z2  y  Si  z1  (U \ Si)  d  c
dm/6e 6 i 6 m/3, z1  y  Si  z2  (U \ Si)  d  c
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t,y  Si  z1  z2  (U \ Si)  d  c
We have the following Borda scores sP∪Q∪{v}(c) = sP∪Q∪{v}(y) + 1 = sP∪Q∪{v}(z2) + 6 =
sP∪Q∪{v}(z1) = sP∪Q∪{v}(ui)+ 1 ∀i ∈ [m]. Hence, c does not win uniquely for the votes P∪Q∪ {v}.
However, c is the unique winner for the votes P∪Q∪ {v′}. Hence, there does not exist any c-optimal
vote and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a NO instance.
In the reverse direction, we show that if the X3C instance is a NO instance, then there does not
exist a vote v of the manipulator and an extension P of P such that c is the unique winner for the
votes P ∪ Q ∪ {v′} thereby proving that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is vacuously
YES (and thus every vote is c-optimal). Notice that the score of y must decrease by at least m/3 for
c to win uniquely. However, in every vote v where the score of y decreases by at least one in any
extension P of P, at least one of z1 or z2 must be placed at top position of the vote v. However,
the candidates z1 and z2 can be placed at top positions of the votes in P at most m/3 many times
while ensuring c does not lose the election. Also, even after manipulator places the candidate ui at
(m+ 5− i)th position for every i ∈ [m], for c to win uniquely, the score of every ui must decrease
by at least one. Hence, altogether, there will be exactly m/3 votes (denoted by the set P1) in any
extension of P where y is placed at the second position. However, since the X3C instance is a NO
instance, the Sis corresponding to the votes in P1 does not form a set cover. Let u ∈ U be an
element not covered by the Sis corresponding to the votes in P1. Notice that the score of u does
not decrease in the extension P and thus c does not win uniquely irrespective of the manipulator’s
vote. Thus every vote is c-optimal and thus the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a YES
instance. Thus every vote is c-optimal and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a YES
instance.
For the maximin voting rule, we show intractability of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION with one
manipulator even when the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is at most 8.
Theorem 8. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the maximin voting rule
even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined pairs in every vote is
no more than 8.
20
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for the maximin rule. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,um}, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We construct a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION instance for the maximin voting rule as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2, z3,d, x,y}
For every i ∈ [t], we define P′i as follows:
∀i 6 t,Si  x  d  y  (U \ Si)  z1  z2  z3
Using P′i, we define partial vote Pi = P
′
i \ ({({x} ∪ Si) × {d,y}}) for every i ∈ [t]. We denote
the set of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We note that the number of
undetermined pairs in each partial vote Pi is 8. We define another partial vote p as follows.
p = (z1  z2  z3  others ) \ {(z1, z2), (z2, z3), (z1, z3)}
Using Lemma 2, we add a set Q of complete votes with |Q| = poly(m, t) to ensure the following
pairwise margins (notice that the pairwise margins among z1, z2, and z3 does not include the partial
vote p). Figure 3 shows the weighted majority graph of the resulting election.
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(d, c) = 4t+ 1
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(x,d) = 4t+ 2m/3+ 1
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(y, x) = 4t− 2m/3+ 1
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(d,uj) = 4t− 1 ∀uj ∈ U
B DP′∪Q(z1, z2) = DP′∪Q(z2, z3) = DP′∪Q(z3, z1) = 4t+ 2
B |DP′∪Q∪{p}(a,b)| 6 1 for every a,b ∈ C not defined above.
We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Now we show that the X3C instance
(U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance (P ∪ Q ∪ {p}, 1, c)
is a NO instance. Notice that we can assume without loss of generality that the manipulator’s vote
prefers c to every other candidate, y to x, x to d, and d to uj for every uj ∈ U.
In the forward direction, let us now assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose
(by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm/3 forms an exact set cover. Notice that the manipulator’s vote must
prefer either z2 to z1 or z1 to z3 or z3 to z2. We show that if the manipulator’s vote v prefers z2
to z1, then v is not a c-optimal vote. The other two cases are symmetrical. Consider the following
extension P of P and p of p.
1 6 i 6 m/3,d  y  Si  x  (U \ Si)  z1  z2  z3
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t,Si  x  d  y  (U \ Si)  z1  z2  z3
p = z2  z3  z1  others
From the votes in P ∪ Q ∪ {v, p}, the maximin score of c is −4t, of d, x,uj ∀uj ∈ U are −4t − 2,
of z1, z3 are at most than −4t − 2, and of z2 is −4t. Hence, c is not the unique maximn winner.
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Figure 3: Weighted majority graph of the reduced instance in Theorem 8. Solid line and dashed
line represent pairwise margins in P′∪Q∪{p} and P′∪Q respectively. The weight of all the edges not
shown in the figure are within −1 to 1. For simplicity, we do not show edges among {u1, . . . ,um}.
However, the manipulator’s vote c  z1  z2  z3  other makes c the unique maximin winner.
Hence, v is not a c-optimal vote.
For the reverse direction, we show that if the X3C instance is a NO instance, then there does
not exist a vote v of the manipulator and an extension P of P such that c is the unique winner for
the votes P∪Q∪ {v′} thereby proving that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is vacuously
YES (and thus every vote is c-optimal). Consider any extension P of P. Notice that, for c to win
uniquely, y  x must be at least m/3 of the votes in P; call these set of votes P1. However, d  x in
every vote in P1 and d  x can be in at most m/3 votes in P for c to win uniquely. Hence, we have
|P1| = m/3. Also for c to win, each d  uj must be at least one vote of P and d  uj is possible
only in the votes in P1. However, the sets Sis corresponding to the votes in P1 does not form a set
cover since the X3C instance is a NO instance. Hence, there must exist a uj ∈ U for which uj  d
in every vote in P and thus c cannot win uniquely irrespective of the vote of the manipulator. Thus
every vote is c-optimal and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a YES instance.
Our next result proves that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the
Copelandα voting rule too for every α ∈ [0, 1] even with one manipulator and at most 8 undeter-
mined pairs per vote.
Theorem 9. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the Copelandα voting
rule for every α ∈ [0, 1] even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined
pairs in each vote is no more than 8.
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for the Copelandα voting rule. Let (U =
{u1, . . . ,um}, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We construct a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC
MANIPULATION instance for the Copelandα voting rule as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2, z3,d1,d2,d3, x,y}
For every i ∈ [t], we define P′i as follows:
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∀i 6 t,Si  x  y  c  others
Using P′i, we define partial vote Pi = P
′
i\({({x}∪Si)×{c,y}}) for every i ∈ [t]. We denote the set
of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We note that the number of undetermined
pairs in each partial vote Pi is 8. We define another partial vote p as follows.
p = (z1  z2  z3  others ) \ {(z1, z2), (z2, z3), (z1, z3)}
Using Lemma 2, we add a set Q of complete votes with |Q| = poly(m, t) to ensure the following
pairwise margins (notice that the pairwise margins among z1, z2, and z3 does not include the partial
vote p). Figure 4 shows the weighted majority graph of the resulting election.
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(uj, c) = 2 ∀uj ∈ U
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(x,y) = 2m/3
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(c,y) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(x, c) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(di, c) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(zk, c) =
DP′∪Q∪{p}(uj, x) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(x, zk) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(di, x) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(y,uj) =
DP′∪Q∪{p}(di,y) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(y, zk) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(zk,uj) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(uj,di) =
DP′∪Q∪{p}(zk,d1) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(zk,d2) = DP′∪Q∪{p}(d3, zk) = 4t ∀i,k ∈ [3], j ∈ [m]
B DP′∪Q∪{p}(uj,u`) = −4t for at least m/3 many u` ∈ U
B DP′∪Q(z1, z2) = DP′∪Q(z2, z3) = DP′∪Q(z3, z1) = 1
B |DP′∪Q∪{p}(a,b)| 6 1 for every a,b ∈ C not defined above.
We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Now we show that the X3C instance
(U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance (P ∪ Q ∪ {p}, 1, c)
is a NO instance. Since the number of voters is odd, α does not play any role in the reduction and
thus from here on we simply omit α. Notice that we can assume without loss of generality that the
manipulator’s vote prefers c to every other candidate and x to y.
In the forward direction, let us now assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose
(by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm/3 forms an exact set cover. Suppose the manipulator’s vote v order
z1, z2, and z3 as z1  z2  z3. We will show that v is not a c-optimal vote. Symmetrically, we
can show that the manipulator’s vote ordering z1, z2, and z3 in any other order is not c-optimal.
Consider the following extension P of P and p of p.
1 6 i 6 m/3,y  c  Si  x  others
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t,Si  x  y  c  others
p = z1  z2  z3  others
From the votes in P∪Q∪ {v, p}, the Copeland score of c ism+4 (defeating y, zk,uj ∀k ∈ [3], j ∈
[m]), of y ism+3 (defeating zk,uj ∀k ∈ [3], j ∈ [m]), of uj is at most 2m/3+4 (defeating x,di ∀i ∈ [3]
and at most 2m/3 many u` ∈ U), of x is 5 (defeating c,y, zk ∀l ∈ [3]), of d1,d2 is 2 (defeating y
and c), of d3 is 5 (defeating y, c, zk ∀k ∈ [3]). of z3 is m + 3 (defeating di,uj∀i ∈ [3], j ∈ [m])
for every k ∈ [3], of z3 is m + 2 (defeating d1,d2,uji ∈ [3], j ∈ [m]), z2 is m + 3 (defeating
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Figure 4: Weighted majority graph of the reduced instance in Theorem 9. Solid line and dashed
line represent pairwise margins in P′ ∪ Q ∪ {p} and P′ ∪ Q respectively. The weight of all the edges
not shown in the figure are within −1 to 1. The weight of all unlabeled edges are 4t. For simplicity,
we do not show edges among {u1, . . . ,um}.
24
d1,d2, z3,uji ∈ [3], j ∈ [m]), z1 is m + 4 (defeating d1,d2, z2, z3,uji ∈ [3], j ∈ [m]). Hence, c
co-wins with z1 with Copeland score m + 4. However, the manipulator’s vote c  z3  z2  z1
makes c win uniquely. Hence, v is not a c-optimal vote and thus the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION
instance is a NO instance.
For the reverse direction, we show that if the X3C instance is a NO instance, then there does
not exist a vote v of the manipulator and an extension P of P such that c is the unique winner for
the votes P∪Q∪ {v′} thereby proving that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is vacuously
YES (and thus every vote is c-optimal). Consider any extension P of P. Notice that, for c to win
uniquely, c must defeat each uj ∈ U and thus c is preferred over uj in at least one vote in P; we
call these votes P1. However, in every vote in P1, y is preferred over x and thus |P1| 6 m/3 because
x must defeat y for c to win uniquely. Since the X3C instance is a NO instance, there must be a
candidate u ∈ U which is not covered by the sets corresponding to the votes in P1 and thus u is
preferred over c in every vote in P. Hence, c cannot win uniquely irrespective of the vote of the
manipulator. Thus every vote is c-optimal and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a YES
instance.
For the Bucklin and simplified Bucklin voting rules, we show intractability of the OPPORTUNIS-
TIC MANIPULATION problem with at most 15 undetermined pairs per vote and only one manipulator.
Theorem 10. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is co-NP-hard for the Bucklin and simpli-
fied Bucklin voting rules even when the number of manipulators is one and the number of undetermined
pairs in each vote is no more than 15.
Proof. We reduce X3C to OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION for the Bucklin and simplified Bucklin
voting rules. Let (U = {u1, . . . ,um}, S = {S1,S2, . . . ,St}) is an X3C instance. We assume without
loss of generality that m is not divisible by 6 (if not, we introduce three elements in U and a set
containing them in S) and t is an even integer (if not, we duplicate any set in S). We construct
a corresponding OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance for the Bucklin and simplified Bucklin
voting rules as follows.
Candidate set C = U ∪ {c, z1, z2, x1, x2,d} ∪W, where |W| = m− 3
For every i ∈ [t], we define P′i as follows:
∀i 6 t, (U \ Si)  Si  d  x1  x2  z1  z2  others
Using P′i, we define partial vote Pi = P
′
i \ ({({d} ∪ Si) × {x1, x2, z1, z2}} ∪ {(z1, z2)}) for every
i ∈ [t]. We denote the set of partial votes {Pi : i ∈ [t]} by P and {P′i : i ∈ [t]} by P′. We note that the
number of undetermined pairs in each partial vote Pi is 15. We introduce the following additional
complete votes Q:
B t/2− bm/6c− 1 copies of W  z1  z2  x1  c  others
B t/2− bm/6c− 1 copies of W  z1  z2  x2  c  others
B 2dm/6e copies of W  z1  z2  d  c  others
B bm/6c copies of W  z1  d  x1  c  others
B bm/6c copies of W  z1  d  x2  c  others
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B 2dm/6e− 1 copies of U  x1  others
B One U  c  others
We have only one manipulator who tries to make c winner. Now we show that the X3C instance
(U, S) is a YES instance if and only if the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance (P∪Q, 1, c) is a NO
instance. The total number of voters in the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is 2t+2m/3+1.
We notice that within top m+ 1 positions of the votes in P′ ∪ Q, c appears t+m/3 times, z1 and z2
appear t+ bm/6c times, x1 appears t/2+m/3− 1 times, x2 appears t/2− 1 times, every candidate in
W appears t+m/3− 1 times, every candidate in U appears t+m/3+ 1 times. Also every candidate
in U appears t+m/3+ 1 times within top m positions of the votes in P∪Q. Hence, for both Bucklin
and simplified Bucklin voting rules, we can assume without loss of generality that the manipulator
puts c, every candidate in W, x1, x2, and exactly one of z1 and z2.
In the forward direction, let us now assume that the X3C instance is a YES instance. Suppose
(by renaming) that S1, . . . ,Sm/3 forms an exact set cover. Suppose the manipulator’s vote v puts
c, every candidate in W, x1, x2, and z1 within top m + 1 positions. We will show that v is not
c-optimal. The other case where the manipulator’s vote v′ puts c, every candidate inW, x1, x2, and
z2 within top m+ 1 positions is symmetrical. Consider the following extension P of P:
1 6 i 6 bm/6c, (U \ Si)d  x1  x2  z2  Si  z1  others
dm/6e 6 i 6 m/3, (U \ Si)d  x1  x2  z1  Si  z2  others
m/3+ 1 6 i 6 t, (U \ Si)  Si  d  x1  x2  z1  z2  others
For both Bucklin and simplified Bucklin voting rules, c co-wins with z1 for the votes in P ∪ Q ∪ {v}.
However, c wins uniquely for the votes in P∪Q∪ {v′}. Hence, v is not a c-optimal vote and thus the
OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a NO instance.
For the reverse direction, we show that if the X3C instance is a NO instance, then there does
not exist a vote v of the manipulator and an extension P of P such that c is the unique winner for
the votes P∪Q∪ {v′} thereby proving that the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is vacuously
YES (and thus every vote is c-optimal). Consider any extension P of P. Notice that, for c to win
uniquely, every candidate must be pushed out of top m + 1 positions in at least one vote in P; we
call these set of votes P1. Notice that, |P1| > m/3. However, in every vote in P1, at least one of
z1 and z2 appears within top m + 1 many positions. Since, the manipulator has to put at least
one of z1 and z2 within its top m + 1 positions and z1 and z2 appear t + bm/6c times in the votes
in P′ ∪ Q, we must have |P1| 6 m/3 and thus |P1| = m/3, for c to win uniquely. However, there
exists a candidate u ∈ U not covered by the Sis corresponding to the votes in P1. Notice that u gets
majority within topm positions of the votes and c can never get majority within topm+1 positions
of the votes. Hence, c cannot win uniquely irrespective of the vote of the manipulator. Thus every
vote is c-optimal and the OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION instance is a YES instance.
4 Polynomial Time Algorithms
We now turn to the polynomial time cases depicted in Table 1. This section is organized in three
parts, one for each problem considered.
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4.1 Weak Manipulation
Since the POSSIBLE WINNER problem is in P for the plurality and the veto voting rules [BD09], it
follows from Observation 1 that the WEAK MANIPULATION problem is in P for the plurality and veto
voting rules for any number of manipulators.
Proposition 1. The WEAK MANIPULATION problem is in P for the plurality and veto voting rules for
any number of manipulators.
Proof. The POSSIBLE WINNER problem is in P for the plurality and the veto voting rules [BD09].
Hence, the result follows from Observation 1.
4.2 Strong Manipulation
We now discuss our algorithms for the STRONG MANIPULATION problem. The common flavor in all
our algorithms is the following: we try to devise an extension that is as adversarial as possible for
the favorite candidate c, and if we can make c win in such an extension, then roughly speaking,
such a strategy should work for other extensions as well (where the situation only improves for c).
However, it is challenging to come up with an extension that is globally dominant over all the others
in the sense that we just described. So what we do instead is we consider every potential nemesis
w who might win instead of c, and we build profiles that are “as good as possible” for w and “as
bad as possible” for c. Each such profile leads us to constraints on how much the manipulators can
afford to favor w (in terms of which positions among the manipulative votes are safe for w). We
then typically show that we can determine whether there exists a set of votes that respects these
constraints, either by using a greedy strategy or by an appropriate reduction to a flow problem.
We note that the overall spirit here is similar to the approaches commonly used for solving the
NECESSARY WINNER problem, but as we will see, there are non-trivial differences in the details. We
begin with the k-approval and k-veto voting rules.
Theorem 11. The STRONG MANIPULATION problem is in P for the k-approval and k-veto voting rules,
for any k and any number of manipulators.
Proof. For the time being, we just concentrate on non-manipulators’ votes. For each candidate
c′ ∈ C \ {c}, calculate the maximum possible value of smaxNM (c, c′) = sNM(c′) − sNM(c) from non-
manipulators’ votes, where sNM(a) is the score that candidate a receives from the votes of the
non-manipulators. This can be done by checking all 4 possible score combinations that c and c′ can
get in each vote v and choosing the one which maximizes sv(c′)− sv(c) from that vote. We now fix
the position of c at the top position for the manipulators’ votes and we check if it is possible to place
other candidates in the manipulators’ votes such that the final value of smaxNM (c, c
′)+sM(c′)−sM(c)
is negative which can be solved easily by reducing it to the max flow problem which is polynomial
time solvable.
We now prove that the STRONG MANIPULATION problem for scoring rules is in P for one manip-
ulator.
Theorem 12. The STRONG MANIPULATION problem is in P for any scoring rule when we have only
one manipulator.
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Proof. For each candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}, calculate smaxNM (c, c′) using same technique described in
the proof of Theorem 11. We now put c at the top position of the manipulator’s vote. For each
candidate c′ ∈ C \ {c}, c′ can be placed at positions i ∈ {2, . . . ,m} in the manipulator’s vote which
makes smaxNM (c, c
′)+αi−α1 negative. Using this, construct a bipartite graph with C\ {c} on left and
{2, . . . ,m} on right and there is an edge between c′ and i iff the candidate c′ can be placed at i in
the manipulator’s vote according to the above criteria. Now solve the problem by finding existence
of perfect matching in this graph.
Our next result proves that the STRONG MANIPULATION problem for the Bucklin, simplified
Bucklin, Fallback, and simplified Fallback voting rules are in P.
Theorem 13. The STRONG MANIPULATION problem is in P for the Bucklin, simplified Bucklin, Fall-
back, and simplified Fallback voting rules, for any number of manipulators.
Proof. Let (C,P,M, c) be an instance of STRONG MANIPULATION for simplified Bucklin, and let m
denote the total number of candidates in this instance. Recall that the manipulators have to cast
their votes so as to ensure that the candidate c wins in every possible extension of P. We use
Q to denote the set of manipulating votes that we will construct. To begin with, without loss of
generality, the manipulators place c in the top position of all their votes. We now have to organize
the positioning of the remaining candidates across the votes of the manipulators to ensure that c is
a necessary winner of the profile (P,Q).
To this end, we would like to develop a system of constraints indicating the overall number of
times that we are free to place a candidate w ∈ C \ {c} among the top ` positions in the profile Q.
In particular, let us fix w ∈ C \ {c} and 2 6 ` 6 m. Let ηw,` be the maximum number of votes of Q
in which w can appear in the top ` positions. Our first step is to compute necessary conditions for
ηw,`.
We use Pw,` to denote a set of complete votes that we will construct based on the given partial
votes. Intuitively, these votes will represent the “worst” possible extensions from the point of view
of c when pitted against w. These votes are engineered to ensure that the manipulators can make
c win the elections Pw,` for all w ∈ C \ {c} and ` ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, if, and only if, they can strongly
manipulate in favor of c. More formally, there exists a voting profile Q of the manipulators so that
c wins the election Pw,` ∪ Q, for all w ∈ C \ {c} and ` ∈ {2, . . . ,m} if and only if c wins in every
extension of the profile P ∪ Q.
We now describe the profile Pw,`. The construction is based on the following case analysis,
where our goal is to ensure that, to the extent possible, we position c out of the top `− 1 positions,
and incorporate w among the top ` positions.
B Let v ∈ P be such that either c and w are incomparable or w  c. We add the complete vote
v′ to Pw,`, where v′ is obtained from v by placing w at the highest possible position and c at
the lowest possible position, and extending the remaining vote arbitrarily.
B Let v ∈ P be such that c  w, but there are at least ` candidates that are preferred over w in
v. We add the complete vote v′ to Pw,`, where v′ is obtained from v by placing c at the lowest
possible position, and extending the remaining vote arbitrarily.
B Let v ∈ P be such that c is forced to be within the top ` − 1 positions, then we add the
complete vote v′ to Pw,`, where v′ is obtained from v by first placing w at the highest possible
position followed by placing c at the lowest possible position, and extending the remaining
vote arbitrarily.
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B In the remaining votes, notice that whenever w is in the top ` positions, c is also in the top
`− 1 positions. Let P∗w,` denote this set of votes, and let t be the number of votes in P
∗
w,`.
We now consider two cases. Let d`(c) be the number of times c is placed in the top ` − 1 positions
in the profile Pw,` ∪ Q, and let d`(w) be the number of times w is placed in the top ` positions in
the profile Pw,`. Let us now formulate the requirement that in Pw,` ∪ Q, the candidate c does not
have a majority in the top ` − 1 positions and w does have a majority in the top ` positions. Note
that if this requirement holds for any w and `, then strong manipulation is not possible. Therefore,
to strongly manipulate in favor of c, we must ensure that for every choice of w and `, we are able
to negate the conditions that we derive.
The first condition from above simply translates to d`(c) 6 n/2. The second condition amounts
to requiring first, that there are at least n/2 votes where w appears in the top ` positions, that is,
d`(w) + ηw,` + t > n/2. Further, note that the gap between d`(w) + ηw,` and majority will be filled
by using votes from P∗w,` to “push” w forward. However, these votes contribute equally to w and
c being in the top ` and ` − 1 positions, respectively. Therefore, the difference between d`(w) +
ηw,` and n/2 must be less than the difference between d`(c) and n/2. Summarizing, the following
conditions, which we collectively denote by (?), are sufficient to defeat c in some extension: d`(c) 6
n/2,d`(w) + ηw,` + t > n/2,n/2− d`(w) + ηw,` < n/2− d`(c).
From the manipulator’s point of view, the above provides a set of constraints to be satisfied as
they place the remaining candidates across their votes. Whenever d`(c) > n/2, the manipulators
place any of the other candidates among the top ` positions freely, because c already has majority.
On the other hand, if d`(c) 6 n/2, then the manipulators must respect at least one of the following
constraints: ηw,` 6 n/2− t− d`(w) and ηw,` 6 d`(c) − d`(w).
Extending the votes of the manipulator while respecting these constraints (or concluding that
this is impossible to do) can be achieved by a natural greedy strategy — construct the manipulators’
votes by moving positionally from left to right. For each position, consider each manipulator and
populate her vote for that position with any available candidate. We output the profile if the process
terminates by completing all the votes, otherwise, we say NO.
We now argue the proof of correctness. Suppose the algorithm returns NO. This implies that
there exists a choice of w ∈ C \ {c} and ` ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that for any voting profile Q of the
manipulators, the conditions in (?) are satisfied. (Indeed, if there exists a voting profile that violated
at least one of these conditions, then the greedy algorithm would have discovered it.) Therefore,
no matter how the manipulators cast their vote, there exists an extension where c is defeated. In
particular, for the votes in P\P∗w,`, this extension is given by Pw,`. Further, we choose n/2−ηw,`−
d`(w) votes among the votes in P∗w,` and extend them by placing w in the top ` positions (and
extending the rest of the profile arbitrary). We extend the remaining votes in P∗w,` by positioning
w outside the top ` positions. Clearly, in this extension, c fails to achieve majority in the top ` − 1
positions while w does achieve majority in the top ` positions.
On the other hand, if the algorithm returns YES, then consider the voting profile of the manipu-
lators. We claim that c wins in every extension of P ∪ Q. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists
an extension R and a candidate w such that the simplified Bucklin score of c is no more than the
simplified Bucklin score of w in R. In this extension, therefore, there exists ` ∈ {2, . . . ,m} for which
w attains majority in the top ` positions and c fails to attain majority in the top ` − 1 positions.
However, note that this is already impossible in any extension of the profile Pw,l ∪ P∗w,`, because
of the design of the constraints. By construction, the number of votes in which c appears in the top
`− 1 positions in R is only greater than the number of times c appears in the top `− 1 positions in
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any extension of Pw,l ∪ P∗w,` (and similarly for w). This leads us to the desired contradiction.
For the Bucklin voting rule, we do the following modifications to the algorithm. If d`(c) > d`(w)
for some w ∈ C \ {c} and ` < m, then we make ηw,` =∞. The proof of correctness for the Bucklin
voting rule is similar to the proof of correctness for the simplified Bucklin voting rule above.
For Fallback and simplified Fallback voting rules, we consider the number of candidates each
voter approves while computing ηw,`. We output YES if and only if ηw,` > 0 for every w ∈ C \ {c}
and every ` 6 m, since we can assume, without loss of generality, that the manipulator approves
the candidate c only. Again the proof of correctness is along similar lines to the proof of correctness
for the simplified Bucklin voting rule.
We next show that the STRONG MANIPULATION problem for the maximin voting rule is
polynomial-time solvable when we have only one manipulator.
Theorem 14. The STRONG MANIPULATION problem for the maximin voting rules are in P, when we
have only one manipulator.
Proof. For the time being, just concentrate on non-manipulators’ votes. Using the algorithm for
NW for maximin in [XC11], we compute for all pairs w,w′ ∈ C, N(w,w′)(w,d) and N(w,w′)(c,w′)
for all d ∈ C \ {c}. This can be computed in polynomial time. Now we place c at the top position
in the manipulator’s vote and increase all N(w,w′)(c,w′) by one. Now we place a candidate w at
the second position if for all w′ ∈ C, N′(w,w′)(w,d) < N(w,w′)(c,w′) for all d ∈ C \ {c}, where
N′(w,w′)(w,d) = N(w,w′)(w,d) of the candidate d has already been assigned some position in the
manipulator’s vote, andN′(w,w′)(w,d) = N(w,w′)(w,d)+1 else. The correctness argument is in the
similar lines of the classical greedy manipulation algorithm of [BITT89].
4.3 Opportunistic Manipulation
For the plurality, Fallback, and simplified Fallback voting rules, it turns out that the voting profile
where all the manipulators approve only c is a c-opportunistic voting profile, and therefore it is
easy to devise a manipulative vote.
Observation 4. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is in P for the plurality and Fallback
voting rules for a any number of manipulators.
For the veto voting rule, however, a more intricate argument is needed, that requires building
a system of constraints and a reduction to a suitable instance of the maximum flow problem in a
network, to show polynomial time tractability of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION.
Theorem 15. The OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION problem is in P for the veto voting rule for a
constant number of manipulators.
Proof. Let (P, `, c) be an input instance of OPPORTUNISTIC MANIPULATION. We may assume without
loss of generality that the manipulators approve c. We view the voting profile of the manipulators
as a tuple (na)a∈C\{c} ∈ (N ∪ {0})m−1 with
∑
a∈C\{c} na = `, where the na many manipulators
disapprove a. We denote the set of such tuples as T and we have |T| = O((2m)`) which is poly-
nomial in m since ` is a constant. A tuple (na)a∈C\{c} ∈ T is not c-optimal if there exists another
tuple (n′a)a∈C\{c} ∈ T and an extension P of P with the following properties. We denote the veto
score of a candidate from P by s(·). For every candidate a ∈ C \ {c}, we define two quantities w(a)
and d(a) as follows.
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B s(c) > s(a) for every a ∈ C \ {c} with na = n′a = 0 and we define w(a) = s(c) − 1,d(a) = 0
B s(c) > s(a)−n′a for every a ∈ C\{c}with na > n′a and we definew(a) = s(c)−n′a−1,d(a) =
0
B s(a) − na > s(c) > s(a) − n′a for every a ∈ C \ {c} with na < n′a and we define w(a) =
s(c) − n′a,d(a) = s(a) − na
We guess the value of s(c). Given a value of s(c), we check the above two conditions by reducing
this to a max flow problem instance as follows. We have a source vertex s and a sink t. We have a
vertex for every a ∈ C (call this set of vertices Y) and a vertex for every vote v ∈ P (call this set of
vertices X). We add an edge from s to each in X of capacity one. We add an edge of capacity one
from a vertex x ∈ X to a vertex y ∈ Y if the candidate corresponding to the vertex y can be placed
at the last position in an extension of the partial vote corresponding to the vertex x. We add an
edge from a vertex y to t of capacity w(a), where a is the voter corresponding to the vertex y. We
also set the demand of every vertex y d(a) (that is the total amount of flow coming into vertex y
must be at least d(a)), where a is the voter corresponding to the vertex y. Clearly, the above three
conditions are met if and only if there is a feasible |P| amount of flow in the above flow graph. Since
s(c) can have only |P| + 1 possible values (from 0 to P) and |T| = O((2m)`), we can iterate over
all possible pairs of tuples in T and all possible values of s(c) and find a c-optimal voting profile if
there exists a one.
5 Conclusion
We revisited many settings where the complexity barrier for manipulation was non-existent, and
studied the problem under an incomplete information setting. Our results present a fresh perspec-
tive on the use of computational complexity as a barrier to manipulation, particularly in cases that
were thought to be dead-ends (because the traditional manipulation problem was polynomially
solvable). To resurrect the argument of computational hardness, we have to relax the model of
complete information, but we propose that the incomplete information setting is more realistic,
and many of our hardness results work even with very limited incompleteness of information.
Our work is likely to be the starting point for further explorations. To begin with, we leave
open the problem of completely establishing the complexity of strong, opportunistic, and weak
manipulations for all the scoring rules. Other fundamental forms of manipulation and control do
exist in voting, such as destructive manipulation and control by adding candidates. It would be
interesting to investigate the complexity of these problems in a partial information setting.
Another exciting direction is the study of average case complexity, as opposed to the worst
case results that we have pursued. These studies have already been carried out in the setting of
complete information [PR06, FP10, Wal10]. Studying the problems that we propose in the average-
case model would reveal further insights on the robustness of the incomplete information setting
as captured by our model involving partial orders.
Our results showed that the impact of paucity of information on the computational complexity
of manipulation crucially depends on the notion of manipulation under consideration. We also ar-
gued that different notions of manipulation may be applicable to different situations, maybe based
of how optimistic (or pessimistic) the manipulators are. One important direction of future research
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is to run extensive experimentations on real and synthetic data to know how people manipulate in
the absence of complete information.
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